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Abstract 
Historically, the Japanese farmland market has been strongly regulated, although 
fundamental changes in policy were introduced in 1967 and 1980. This paper 
examines the relationship between farmland prices and rents in Japan for 1955-2000 
using the cointegration procedure of Johansen et al. (2000) which admits structural 
breaks. Results show the presence of a cointegrating relationship with a significant 
break in 1980. There is Granger-causality from prices to rents, which suggests that 
  
2 
 
rents are determined within an institutional setting according to farmland prices. The 
rent-price elasticity is unity which supports the notion of efficiency in the farmland 
market. 
 
JEL Classification: C32, Q15, Q18 
Keywords: farmland market, Japan, cointegration, structural breaks 
1.  Introduction 
Japan faces several major problems in terms of its farmland. First, average 
farm size is still less than 2 hectares, despite a number of policy measures over the 
past 40 years designed to foster larger holdings. Second, the area of abandoned 
farmland has been increasing, more than doubling between 1975 and 2000 (MAFF, 
2000). Additionally, like many industrialised countries, Japan is under mounting 
international pressure to liberalise its farming sector and promote a more competitive 
agriculture. In all of these concerns, the farmland market has a key role.  
 
Farmland issues in Japan have been addressed from the perspectives of a 
number of different disciplines - sociology, geography, engineering and economics - 
due perhaps to the variety of what are perceived to be important contributory factors, 
e.g. family, terrain, irrigation and prices. From the economics perspective, there is a 
strong belief by some commentators that the theoretical models dominant in Europe 
and North America are inappropriate to the Japanese situation because, owing to 
government policy and the distinctive nature of Japanese farmers' behaviour, the land 
market is inefficient and distorted. Links between market inefficiency and the 
structural problems in Japanese agriculture are addressed by Honma (1994), Egaitsu 
and Shogenji (1995) and Kusakari (1998). Similarly, the importance of Japanese 
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farmers' behaviour in holding on to land in the expectation of windfall profits from 
conversion to non-agricultural use is highlighted by Godo (1998, 2006 and 2007), 
who argues that farmland abandonment would not occur if policy and legislation were 
strictly enforced to deter such speculative possession. 
 
The Present Valuation Model (PVM), based on Campbell and Shiller (1987 
and 1988), which has been used widely in the study of the farmland market in Europe 
and North America (e.g., Burt, 1986; Featherstone and Baker, 1987; Lloyd et al., 
1991; and Hallam et al., 1992), postulates that farmland prices are determined by 
rents. Although the PVM has strong theoretical appeal, empirical studies have often 
produced disappointing results. In response, some authors have included additional 
explanatory variables, e.g. transaction costs, risk and speculation. In spite of 
modifications to theory, empirical testing of the PVM remains inconclusive and 
Gutierrez et al. (2007) suggest that the problem may be deficiencies in the 
econometric methods employed. Whatever the correct specification of the PVM and 
the estimation method used, in the Japanese situation there is a more fundamental 
question regarding the direction of causality in the farmland price-rent relationship. In 
Japan, farm rents historically have been determined via a process of institutional 
governance and it is quite possible therefore that farmland price, rather than being 
determined by rent, is itself the determinant of rent. This is the issue we explore.  
 
Japan has strict legislation limiting farmland conversion to non-agricultural 
use, although it is weakly enforced and there are many loopholes (Godo, 2007). In 
practice, farmland conversion, particularly for use in the public sector (e.g. roads and 
public facilities), is easily achieved even in those areas with special protection from 
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non-agricultural demands. Egaitsu and Shogenji (1995), whilst arguing that falls in 
farmland prices in rural areas are the result of deteriorating agricultural profitability, 
acknowledge the influence of speculation on farmland markets which are close to the 
urban fringe. However, the speculative motive for explaining inefficiency in the 
Japanese farmland market may be exaggerated because such behaviour should only be 
present when and where opportunities exist (Ishii, 1991). Moreover, land price 
differentials between rural and urban fringe areas are not specific to Japan. Just and 
Miranowski (1993) find that land price expectations are the most important factor in 
determining land prices in the USA, but point out that these are themselves 
determined by yet other factors, including inflation and the opportunity cost of capital, 
as well as farm returns. Similarly, Goodwin et al. (2003) account explicitly for non-
agricultural demands in the USA by including indicators of urban pressure 
(population, population growth and housing permits) in their model, which is 
estimated from farm-level data. While the speculative motive may reflect rational 
economic behaviour on the part of Japanese farmers, the more fundamental question 
remains as to whether a PVM-type approach is appropriate. That is, does rent 
determine land price in Japan? 
 
We examine the relationship between farmland prices and rents in Japan 
empirically using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model which does not impose 
causality ex ante. This approach allows us to compare the PVM, where price is 
determined by rent, with what we term an 'institutional model' where rent is 
determined by price. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses farm rents 
and prices in Japan; Section 3 outlines the theory and empirical models; Section 4 
reports the data and results; and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Farm Rents and Prices in Japan 
The farmland market in Japan has been subject to a system of strict controls, 
although the situation has eased in more recent times following changes in social 
conditions and government policy. Land reform began immediately after the Second 
World War as a part of the transformation from feudalism to democracy. The main 
pillars of land reform were the reduction of rent and conversion of rent-in-kind to 
money rent, the creation of 'owner-cultivators', and the democratisation of the 
agricultural land committees (Koppel and Kim, 1993). Post-war, the main principle of 
farmland ownership was based strictly on owner-cultivators whose rights were 
protected under the Agricultural Land Law of 1952. Although interpreted more 
recently as 'cultivator-protection' (Sekiya, 2002), this principle restricted the 
ownership of land to individuals rather than business corporations, until 2000, 
because of concerns regarding speculative possession.1  
 
Under the 1952 law, the maximum level of farm rent was controlled, but in 
1967 the policy was revised and direct rent control abolished in 1970. However, as a 
transitional measure, the control system was applied for a further 10 years to ongoing 
tenanted land, resulting in a marked increase in rent at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Following this policy change, the control system evolved into a 'standard system' 
which gave local Chambers of Agriculture a role in setting rents and advising on 
reductions in rents which were considered too high. Thus, after introduction of the 
                                                 
1
 However, Agricultural Production Corporations have been able to own farmland 
since 1962.  
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standard system, the rent level was no longer controlled, but monitored by local 
agricultural committees (Sekiya, 2002). These committees still oversee rents and are 
able to exert influence in cases where the level may be regarded as high. 
 
Although the farmland market in Japan has been strictly regulated through 
property right and rent determination, farmland prices have not been directly 
controlled. Instead, as in many developed countries, zoning has been applied to 
prevent speculative price movements arising from the demands of non-agricultural 
land use, especially in urban and urban-fringe areas. Counter to the New City 
Planning Law in 1968 which, inter alia, encompassed a large area of farmland, the 
Agricultural Land Use Promoting Law (1969) designated that 'farming areas' were not 
allowed to convert to non-agricultural use, barring exceptions. In return, farmers 
received various subsidies and tax incentives. Godo (1998 and 2007) is critical of the 
effectiveness of these regulations and argues that the farmland market, even in rural 
areas, is distorted because farmers rarely sell or lease land, and may even opt for land 
abandonment in the hope of future windfall gains from buy-outs by the public 
authorities who require land for non-agricultural use. Although the regulations 
prohibit land abandonment, in practice the penalties are ineffective. 
 
Aggregated data of actual transaction prices for land are not available. The 
data we use in our empirical analysis are based on surveys undertaken by the 
Chambers of Agriculture to which all local transactions have to be reported. In the 
process of collection, the Chambers of Agriculture exclude from the data outliers 
which look odd in comparison to the local average. This partially allays fears that 
exceptionally high prices due to speculation may undermine our empirical analysis. 
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The resulting dataset is the most consistent and longest time series of national land 
prices and rents available in Japan. The data relate to the average price (1,000yen/are) 
and rent (yen/are) of 'good' paddy and 'good' vegetable fields (Japan Real Estate 
Institute). Real prices and rents are calculated using the GDP deflator.  
 
From inspection of Japanese annual farmland prices and rents in real terms for 
1955-2000 in Figure 1, there is a notable increase in rent around 1967 due to the 
revised maximum levels. Although direct control ended in 1970, a further marked 
increase in rent around 1980 highlights the policy change at the end of the 
transitionary period. Prices increased from the mid-1960s until 1984, but have since 
declined. This is most likely a result of falling profitability due to a chronic decrease 
in agricultural product prices (Egaitsu and Shogenji, 1995). The general pattern of 
prices appears similar to that of rents, but perhaps a better illustration of the 
relationship between the two is the rent/price ratio shown in Figure 2. Here, the 
impacts of the policy changes in 1967 and 1980 are more evident, particularly the 
latter.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
3. Empirical Model of the Farmland Market  
When farmland prices reflect the productivity (or profitability) of land, the 
land market is efficient and price should equal the expected present value of future 
rents. This is the so-called PVM which, following inter alia Burt (1986), Featherstone 
and Baker (1987) and Falk (1991), can be represented as: 
]R[EP jtt
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where Pt is the equilibrium farmland price at the beginning of time period t; Rt is the 
rent paid in period t, α is a constant discount factor equal to 1/(1+i) where i is the 
constant real discount rate and determined elsewhere, and Et is the conditional 
expectations operator based on information available at time t. Equation (1) implies a 
long-run relationship between the real price of farmland and its real return. Denote P* 
and R* as the long-run equilibrium price and a constant expectation of equilibrium 
return and (1) simplifies to: 
rp 10 β+β=             (2) 
where p=lnP*, r=lnR*, β1=1 and β0=ln(1/i) where ln is the natural logarithm. 
Following Lloyd (1994), we use the term 'market efficiency' to describe the restriction 
that β1=1 in (2) where a 1% increase in rent leads to a 1% increase in price. The 
present value of a stream of rents in (1) and (2) may not be the only economic 
determinant of the price of land (see, for example, Just and Miranowski, 1993; and 
Goodwin, et al., 2003). Additionally, ownership may confer subjective satisfaction, as 
in Japan, where attachment to land often arises from a duty through sentiment to 
ancestors who acquired the land.  
 
An alternative to the PVM in (2) stems from farm rents being determined by a 
process of institutional governance. Here, the direction of causality is reversed and the 
rent is set in accordance with the farmland price: 
 pr '1
'
0 β+β= .         (3) 
We denote (3) as the 'institutional model'. If β1=1 in (2), then 0'0 β=β  and R=P.i, that 
is, rent is set as a proportion, equal to a (constant) discount rate, of the farmland price. 
Alternatively, rent may be set in an ad hoc manner as a mark-down of the farmland 
price. This margin may vary between different economic environments under 
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alternative policy regimes. Here, the discount rate plays no role in determining rent 
and there is no correspondence between (2) and (3).  
 
 The impact of policy changes in the Japanese farmland market differ between 
the PVM model in (2) and the ad hoc institutional model in (3). In (2), β0 is constant 
since the real discount rate, i, is constant. Accordingly, if the PVM is the true model, 
then farmland policy changes will not affect β0. In contrast, if the institutional model 
in (3) is the true model, rent reform in 1967 and the cessation of rent control in 1980 
may affect '0β , and '1β  is not constrained to be unity.2 We seek to test between these 
two alternatives. 
 
To estimate (2) or (3) without imposing market efficiency, we use a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model which does not assume the direction of causality ex ante: 
tit
k
1i
it εYA µY ++= −
=
∑         (4) 
where Yt=[pt rt]', µ and Ai are matrices of parameters, k is the lag length, and εt are 
error terms. Falk (1991) and Hallam et al. (1992) inter alia note that many time series 
of farmland prices and rents are non-stationary and typically are integrated of order 
one, I(1). Here, ordinary least squares regressions are generally spurious and such 
series must be first-differenced to render them stationary, I(0). Where a linear 
combination of two I(1) series is stationary, they are cointegrated, the problem of 
spurious regression does not arise, and a meaningful long-run equilibrium exists 
(Granger, 1988). The standard test of Johansen (1988) for (non-)cointegration is based 
                                                 
2
 In the institutional model in (3), we also define 'market efficiency' where 1'1 =β . 
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on the estimation of the VAR model in (4) transformed into its vector error-correction 
model (VECM) form. However, if structural breaks within the individual series occur, 
either at different times or at the same time and do not cancel each other out, 
cointegration must be analysed in a framework where breaks in the deterministic 
components are admitted. Johansen et al. (2000, equation 2.6) generalise the standard 
test by admitting up to two predetermined breaks and two models are considered, one 
with a broken level and one with a broken trend. 
 
Denote q as the number of periods into which the sample is divided, and j as 
each period, so in the case of two breaks the sample is divided into three periods 
(j=1,…,q and q=3). Transforming (4) into its VECM form and generalising to admit 
breaks gives: 
t
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where ∆ is the difference operator; Et=[E1t E2t … Eqt]' is a vector of q dummy 
variables with Ej,t=1 (j=1,…,q) if observation t belongs to the jth period and zero 
otherwise, and the first k observations are set to zero. Following Dennis (2006, p.27), 
impulse dummy variables, Dj,t-1 (j=2,…,q), equal unity if observation t is the first 
observation of the jth period and are included to render the corresponding residuals 
zero thereby allowing the conditional likelihood function to be derived given the 
initial values in each period. Intervention dummies, wm,t (m=1,…,d), are also included 
to render the residuals well-behaved following inter alia Hendry and Mizon (1993). 
The short-run parameters are γ of order (2×q), Γi (i=1,...,k-1) of order (2×2), κj 
(j=2,...,q) of order (2×1), and Θm (m=1,…,d) of order (2×1). The innovations, εt, are 
assumed to be iid with mean zero and symmetric and positive definite variance. The 
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long-run drift parameters are µ=[µ1 µ2 … µq], α is a vector of adjustment parameters, 
and β are the long-run coefficients in the cointegration vector. The cointegration 
hypothesis is formulated by testing the rank (r) of  
µ
β
α π
'






=  and its asymptotic 
distribution depends on the number of non-stationary relations, the location of 
breakpoints, and trend specification. 
 
Johansen et al. (2000) examine two models in (2). Model 1 is where there are 
no linear trends in the levels of the endogenous I(1) variables and the first-differenced 
series have a zero mean; here the broken level is restricted to the cointegration space. 
Model 2 is where any long-run linear growth is not accounted for by the model and a 
broken linear trend is present in the cointegration vectors. To test between the models, 
the Pantula principle (Harris and Sollis, 2003, pp.134-135) is used to test the joint 
hypothesis of both rank and deterministic components (Johansen, 1992). 
 
Given the cointegration rank, further restrictions on the cointegration space 
can be tested using log-likelihood ratios (LR). Harris and Sollis (2003, pp.142-152) 
consider these tests in the standard framework but they can be extended here. Assume 
r=1 and q=3 so that 





−
t
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Y
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First, we check for unit roots, testing whether each series is stationary around a 
broken level or trend. The hypothesis of trend stationarity of pt for example is: 
H0: 
′






µ
β
= [* 0 * * *]  or  βr = 0     (6) 
where asterisks (*) denote unrestricted parameters, and LR~ 21χ . Second, we test 
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market efficiency, i.e. the null that β1=1 in the PVM in (2) or that '1β =1 in the 
institutional model in (3): 
H0: 
′






µ
β
= [1 -1 * * *]  or βp = -βr     (7) 
and LR~ 21χ .Third, we test whether the structural breaks are statistically significant. 
Testing the first break for example, the null is that the intercepts or trends are equal in 
the first and second periods, that is: 
H0: 
′






µ
β
= [* * 1 1 *]  or µ1 = µ2     (8) 
and LR~ 21χ . Finally, we examine weak exogeneity. To test for the weak exogeneity of 
pt for example, the null is: 
H0: αp = 0         (9) 
and LR~ 21χ . If the tests imply that αp=0 and αr≠0, price Granger-causes rent, and vice 
versa; and if αp≠0 and αr≠0, there is bi-directional causality or feedback between 
prices and rents. 
 
4. Results 
Using Models 1 and 2 implicit in (5), we test for cointegration between pt and 
rt following Johansen et al. (2000) allowing for breaks in 1967 (with the second 
period starting in 1968) and 1980 (with the third period starting in 1981).3,4 To model 
                                                 
3
 Estimation was carried-out in CATS, Version 2 (Dennis, 2006).  
4
 An alternative model was also estimated which included the real discount rate. 
Results were similar to Lloyd et al. (1991), namely that the real discount rate has no 
significant effect on the rent-farmland price nexus. 
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the dynamics of the system, the number of lags (k) in each model is chosen according 
the Hannan-Quinn criterion, and k=4. We now test for both deterministic components 
in (5) and for cointegration using trace statistics following the Pantula principle, and 
the results are shown in Table 1. One cointegration vector is found (r=1) and Model 1 
is preferred. Thus there is a unique long-run relationship between pt and rt.5 Residual 
mis-specification tests suggest that the residuals are non-normal. Accordingly, Model 
1 is re-estimated with the inclusion of intervention dummies, wm,t in (5) for 1973 and 
1982 where residuals are at least twice the standard deviation of all residuals in each 
error-correction equation. The trace statistics for this modified model are shown in 
Table 1 and the residuals are now well-behaved.6 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
                                                 
5
 The corresponding results where no breaks are admitted following Johanson (1988) 
show no evidence of cointegration between prices and rents. For Model 1, the 
Hannan-Quinn criterion indicates k=2 and the trace statistic for testing the null that 
r=0 is 10.53 [p-value: 0.59], and 1.84 [0.80] when testing r=1. For Model 2 and again 
for k=2, the trace statistic for testing the null that r=0 is 12.08 [0.80], and 3.27 [0.83] 
when testing r=1. This suggests that the modelling of breaks in cointegration analyses 
is important.  
6
 Residual multivariate mis-specification statistics (Dennis, 2006, pp.176-180) are: the 
Doornik and Hansen (1994) test for normality is 8.52 [p-value: 0.07]; the LM-test for 
second-order autocorrelation is 3.76 [0.44]; and the LM-test for ARCH of order two is 
8.84 [0.96]. 
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 Table 2 shows results of the hypothesis tests for Model 1. First, the nulls of 
stationarity of pt and rt in (6) are rejected: both series are I(1), and stationarity implied 
by the cointegrating vector does not come from the stationarity around a broken level 
of one series but from a linear combination of both. Second, the null of market 
efficiency, that βp=-βr in (7), i.e. β1=1 in (2) or '1β =1 in (3), is not rejected. Thus, the 
elasticity between prices and rents is unity and the farmland market in Japan is 
efficient. Third, we test for the existence of breaks in the long-run equilibrium as in 
(8): the null that µ1=µ2 is not rejected while the null that µ2=µ3 is rejected. Thus, the 
break in 1980 is statistically significant and impacts on the long-run link between 
prices and rent. In contrast, the hypothesised break in 1967 is insignificant. Fourth, 
tests for weak exogeneity, as in (9), reveal the null that αp=0 is not rejected while the 
null that αr=0 is rejected. Thus, price is weakly exogenous which implies that rent is 
Granger-caused by prices and the institutional model in (3) is preferred. The estimate 
of the significant adjustment speed coefficient is αr=0.379 which implies that 38% of 
any disequilibrium is removed each year by adjustments in rt, with 90% being 
removed within five years and 99% within 10 years. Adjustment therefore appears to 
be quite fast. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The cointegrating vector is now normalised on rt (since pt is weakly 
exogenous) and the restrictions above, namely that βp=-βr, µ1=µ2 and αp=0, are 
imposed: 
rt = pt + 2.572 E1t + 2.572 E2t + 2.766 E3t + zt .              (10) 
Equation (10) provides two insights. First, only the structural break in 1980 had a 
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permanent effect on the link between rents and farmland prices. Rent was set at 13%7 
of farmland price before 1980 and at 16% thereafter. Thus the break in 1980 resulted 
in an increase of 21% in the rent/price ratio. Second, since the cointegrating 
relationship in (10) is identified, non-rejection of the null that '1β =1 in the preferred 
institutional model in (3) implies that the long-run rent elasticity with respect to the 
farmland price is unity and a 1% increase in price causes a 1% increase in rents. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Japan faces several problems in terms of its agricultural land: small-scale 
farms, a marked increase in land abandonment, and international pressure to become 
more competitive in farming. Economic theory postulates that the market mechanism 
should achieve an efficient allocation of farmland, but there is a belief in Japan that 
this market is distorted due to government intervention through regulations on 
property rights, direct and indirect control of rents, and restrictions on the conversion 
of farmland to non-agricultural uses. In assessing efficiency in the farmland market, 
we have analysed the long-run relationship between price and rent and tested between 
the conventional PVM and an alternative 'institutional model' where the direction of 
causality is reversed.  
 
Using the procedure of Johansen et al. (2000) and data for 1955-2000, we 
tested for cointegration between farmland prices and rents, allowing for structural 
breaks which coincide with policy changes in 1967 and 1980. Results suggest that 
rents are Granger-caused by farmland prices. The break in 1980 is statistically 
                                                 
7
 R/P = e2.572 = 0.13. 
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significant and causes a rise of 21% in the rent/price ratio. The break in 1967 is 
insignificant. The hypothesis of unit elasticity cannot be rejected and a 1% increase in 
farmland price leads to a 1% increase in rents. Results further imply that 38% of any 
disequilibrium is removed each year by adjustments in rent, with 90% being removed 
within five years and 99% within 10 years. 
 
The result that rents are Granger-caused by farmland prices is the opposite of 
what one would expect under the PVM. There are three possible reasons for this. First, 
the theory embodied in the PVM or its specification may be incorrect or incomplete, 
as suggested by the literature that has attempted to modify the price-rent relationship 
(e.g., Just and Miranowski, 1993). Second, the econometric methods employed may 
be inadequate (Gutierrez et al., 2007). Third, and perhaps of most interest in the 
present case, is that whilst the PVM may be appropriate for Europe and North 
America, it is inappropriate for the Japanese situation. This is the possibility we have 
explored and that our results support, but there are three caveats. First, the sample 
comprises 46 observations and it is well-known that tests for cointegration and 
causality have poor size and power properties when applied to individual time series 
of moderate length. Additionally, although we believe our data to be the most 
appropriate available, they may not represent a sufficiently accurate measure of the 
rents and prices actually paid in farmland transactions. Second, we hypothesise either 
that farmland prices are caused by rents or that rents are caused by farmland prices. 
We do not examine whether the causality is from price to rent before rent reform and 
the opposite thereafter, since very small sample sizes would lower size and power 
properties of statistical tests further. Third, if the PVM is the true model, there is a 
tension with its empirical counterpart: the theoretical PVM posits a constant that is a 
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function of the discount rate, while our empirical model allows for the constant to 
vary between policy regimes. However, it appears that the discount rate has no 
significant effect on the rent-price relationship; the constant is significantly different 
between regimes, and prices Granger-cause rents.  
 
In conclusion, we are inclined to concur with the view that the PVM is not an 
appropriate description of the operation of the Japanese farmland market. It appears 
more likely that rents are determined within an institutional setting, and we prefer 
therefore to opt for our institutional model where rents are set as a 'mark-down' on 
farmland prices. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the Japanese farmland market 
is efficient, which is counter to the ideas of some commentators, and that the 
fundamental policy revision in 1980 had a permanent impact on the structure of the 
farmland market. 
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Table 1: Cointegration Tests (Trace Statistics) 
H0   (H1) Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 1 
with intervention dummies (wm,t) 
r=0 (r≥1) 44.94 [0.00] 93.00 [0.00] 48.59 [0.00] 
r=1 (r≥2) 9.62 [0.39]* 10.33 [0.32] 9.98 [0.35] 
Notes:  
1.  p-values in brackets.  
2. * denotes the first time that the null is not rejected in Models 1 and 2 without 
intervention dummies (wm,t) using the Pantula principle. 
3.  Intervention dummies (wm,t) are included for: 1973 and 1982. 
  
22 
 
 
Table 2: Hypothesis Tests 
Null Hypothesis H0 LR-Statistic 
Stationarity of: pt βr = 0 16.86 [0.00] 
   rt βp = 0 9.86 [0.00] 
Market efficiency  βp = -βr 0.51 [0.47] 
Break:   1967 µ1 = µ2 1.49 [0.22] 
    1980 µ2 = µ3 4.15 [0.04] 
Weak exogeneity of: pt αp = 0 3.39 [0.07] 
   rt αr = 0 27.61 [0.00] 
Note: p-values in brackets. 
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Figure  1: Land Price s  and Re nts : 1955-2000
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Fig u re  2: Re n t/Pric e  Ratio : 1955-2000
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